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A PROPOSED TEST FOR APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS TO BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS:
THE NONOBVIOUSNESS TEST
Qing Lin, Ph.D.
Abstract: In patent law, the doctrine of equivalents allows courts to find infringement if
one makes or uses a device or process without substantial change from a patented invention.
A test that clearly defines the appropriate scope of patent protection is crucial to development
in various industries, especially in biotechnology, an industry that requires significant long-
term investment. However, the most commonly applied test for determining equivalents is
vague and fails to provide practical guidance. The "all elements" limitation to the test causes
additional confusion. A more appropriate test for defining the scope of patent protection
would be the "nonobviousness test," a test similar to the nonobviousness requirement when
inventors first apply for patents. The proposed test would benefit from a rich body of case law
on the nonobviousness requirement for obtaining patents, would evaluate inventions as a
whole, and would provide appropriate protection to patent owners. This Comment examines
the recent development of the doctrine of equivalents, analyzes the problems with the current
test that courts use to apply the doctrine, and urges courts to adopt the nonobviousness test to
resolve patent infringement cases.
Consider Company A, which spent years of effort and millions of
dollars to develop and patent a recombinant protein (Recombinant
Protein A) that can dissolve blood clots and prevent heart attacks.
Consider Company B, which also invested significant effort and money
to develop a recombinant protein (Recombinant Protein B) that is
structurally similar to Recombinant Protein A. Recombinant Protein B
has less ability to dissolve blood clots than Recombinant Protein A, but
is less likely to cause uncontrolled bleeding. Does Recombinant Protein
B infringe the patent of Recombinant Protein A? The answer depends on
whether Recombinant Protein B is considered the "equivalent" of
Recombinant Protein A under the doctrine of equivalents.' Thus, the
determination of equivalency among different inventions is crucial to
both patent holders and those inventors working in fields, in which there
are already a myriad of existing patents. Therefore, the legal test courts
adopt to apply the doctrine of equivalents must provide clearly defined
and appropriate boundaries both to protect those with patented inventions
1. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950) (stating
that patent infringement is not limited to copying patented devices, but also includes making or using
equivalent devices); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-28
(1997) (upholding doctrine of equivalents).
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and to encourage others with genuinely new inventions to disclose their
discoveries to the public.
The current test for the application of the doctrine of equivalents,
however, fails to define clearly the patent protection scope. Under the
doctrine, the accused device is equivalent to the patented device if there
is no substantial difference between them.2 To determine whether there is
a substantial difference, courts often apply the function-way-result test,
which examines whether the accused device performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the
same result.3 However, the test provides little practical guidance because
the word "substantially" is inherently vague.' An additional factor for
determining substantial difference is "known interchangeability," which
asks whether a person with ordinary skill in the pertinent technical area
would have known of interchangeability between each element of the
accused device and its corresponding element in the patented device.5
However, the factor's usefulness is limited by the lack of an appropriate
definition of the term "element" and the courts' failure to examine
inventions as a whole.
This Comment urges courts to adopt a test similar to the invention
standard for obtaining a patent-the nonobviousness requirement-to
define the scope of patent protection. Part I briefly introduces patent
protection of biotechnology products. Part II describes the current test
courts use in applying the doctrine of equivalents as well as the policy
issues underlying the doctrine. Part III discusses the problems with this
current test, especially in biotechnology. Part IV explores the
nonobviousness requirement for patentability and proposes a similar test
for determining equivalency in infringement cases. This Comment
concludes that courts should adopt the nonobviousness test for the
application of the doctrine of equivalents.
2. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17.
3. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608; Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1522.
4. See infra Part lILA.
5. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36; Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 (quoting Graver Tank
339 U.S. at 609).
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I. A PRIMER ON PATENT PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
PRODUCTS
The U.S. patent system encourages inventors to disclose their
inventions to the public by granting inventors rights to exclude others for
a limited period of time from using, maldng, selling, or offering to sell
their inventions.6 To be eligible for a patent, the invention must not be
obvious to a person having ordinary skills in the pertinent technical area.'
Upon issuance of the patent the patent owner can enforce his or her
rights against others who use or make the patented device or its
equivalents Properly defining the scope of patent protection is
imperative to technological development, especially in biotechnology, an
industry that requires significant long-term investment.9
A. An Overview of the Patent System
1. The U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "[tio promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.""0 Congress implemented this power by establishing the
patent system." Under this system, patentees disclose their inventions to
the public 2 in exchange for the right to exclude others. 3 The award of
monopoly helps ensure that patentees will recoup their research costs and
6. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998). The statute provides that "[e]very patent shall
contain.., a grant to the patentee... of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States." 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1). The patentee's rights to exclude others from profiting from the
patented invention ends 20 years after the patent application filing date. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1).
7. See 35 U.S.CA. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1998).
8. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1998) ("[lhoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
9. See infra Part 13.
10. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring patentee to disclose how to make and use invention and
what is contemplated best mode of carrying out invention).
13. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
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profit from their inventions, thereby encouraging inventors to disclose
useful innovations to the public.4
2. Patent Prosecution
Patent prosecution is the process by which inventors obtain patents by
applying with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.'" A patent
application contains a specification and claims. 6 The specification
describes the invention and how to make and use the invention. 7 Claims
delineate the scope of an inventor's patent so that others may either
license the invention or try to design around it.'8
To be eligible for patent protection, an invention must be useful,
novel, and nonobvious.' An invention is useful if it benefits humanity."0
It is novel if, as of the filing date of the patent application, the invention
has not been published, publicly sold or used, previously invented, or
abandoned.2 ' An invention is nonobvious if, at the time of invention, a
person having ordinary skill in the pertinent technical area would not
have found the invention obvious in light of prior art.22 The term "prior
art" includes any relevant knowledge, art descriptions and patents that
pertain to but predate the invention at issue.23
14. See Jeffrey S. Dillen, Comment, DNA Patentability-Anything But Obvious, 1997 Wis. L.
Rev. 1023, 1026.
15. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 11l (West Supp. 1998) (requiring inventor to file patent application);
Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and Materials on Patent Law 708 (1998) (defining patent
prosecution as administrative process through which inventor acquires patent).
16. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 111; 35 U.S.C. § 112. Technically, a specification includes claims. See 35
U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims. ). However, patent
practitioners usually regard claims as an element separate from a specification.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.").
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring claims to particularly point out and distinctly claim subject
matter of invention).
19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1994); 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1998).
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law § 2C[2], at 2-50 (1996).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
22. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
23. See Mooney v. Brunswick Corp., 663 F.2d 724, 733 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Brian E. Lewis,
Comment, Expanding the Use of Hypothetical Analysis When Evaluating Patent Infringement Under
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3. The Effect of Obtaining a Patent
A patent provides an inventor the right to exclude others for a limited
period of time from using, making, offering to sell, selling, or importing
the patented inventions without authorization.24 If a person makes or uses
a device having every element in a patent claim, the device literally
infringes the patent.' However, the scope of a patentee's protection
under patent law is broader than mere literal infringement.26 An accused
device may infringe a patent under the doctrine of equivalents even
though it does not duplicate every element in the claim.27 The doctrine of
equivalents protects a patentee's rights against others who make
insubstantial changes to the patentee's claimed invention to escape the
plain language of the patent.2"
B. The Importance ofPatent Protection in Biotechnology
Biotechnology uses living organisms to make commercially and
therapeutically valuable products and processes, including therapeutic
compositions, agricultural products, and industrial products.29 For
instance, recombinant protein technique has allowed the production of a
large quantity of growth factors and enzymes useful in the treatment of
various diseases. 30 Transgenic plant technology has improved crops'
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1409, 1410 n.9 (1993) (stating that prior art
can be understood to mean "existing technology").
24. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 154,271(a) (West Supp. 1998).
25. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ("If accused
matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out ....."); Ronald D. Hantman, Patent
Infringement, 72 1. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc'y 454, 497 (1990) (stating that literal infringement
occurs when accused product or process is within scope of wording of claim).
26. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1997); Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-09.
27. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 (holding that flux composition that substituted silicates of
calcium and manganese for silicates of calcium and magnesium in patented flux composition
infringed patented flux composition).
28. See id.
29. See Rochelle IC Seide, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting IX-1 (Robert C. Faber
ed., 4th ed. 1996).
30. See Competitiveness of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Tech., and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 103d Cong., 3
(1994) [hereinafter Biotech Hearing]. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,752,603, No. 4,766,075, No.
4,853,330 (claiming tissue plasminogen activator ("t-PA"), which can dissolve clots in blood vessels
and is beneficial to heart-attack patients). For detailed description oft-PA, see infra Part lI.A.2.
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resistance to external stress."' In addition, natural and genetically
engineered microorganisms have been used to decontaminate soil and
water.
3 2
Biotechnology is a fast-growing industry. Worldwide annual sales of
biotechnology-derived products grew from zero in 1980 to seven billion
dollars by 1993. 33 In 1997, the annual revenue of publicly traded
biotechnology companies exceeded sixteen billion dollars.34
Proper patent protection is especially important for the continued
growth of the biotechnology industry. The development of commercial
biotechnology products is time-consuming and expensive.35 In 1997, it
took an average of 15.3 years before a new drug could be put on the
market: 6.1 years to discover, 6.9 years to clinically develop, and 2.3
years for FDA approval.36 The average cost of developing a
biotechnology-derived product and bringing it to the market was $359
million dollars in 1993. 3' Because of the cutting-edge nature of the
industry, it was estimated that only five out of 4000 compounds tested in
preclinical trials were eventually tested on humans.38 Even then the FDA
approved only one of those five compounds tested on humans. 39 Thus,
without appropriate patent protection, investors would be understandably
reluctant to invest time and money in the biotechnology industry.
Without that investment, the public ultimately suffers.40
31. See Biotech Hearing, supra note 30, at 29 (1994).
32. See, eg., U.S. Patent No. 5,814,514 (claiming method for degrading undesirable ether-based
environmental contaminant with propane-oxidizing microorganism or isopropanol-oxidizing
microorganism); U.S. Patent No. 5,567,304 (claiming method of biodegrading hydrophobic organic
compounds with microorganism).
33. See Biotech Hearing. supra note 30, 18, 29.
34. See Public Biotech: The Numbers, 16 Nature Biotechnology 425 (1998).
35. See Alan Walton, The Annual State of the Biotech Industry Address: Walton's Words of
Wisdom, 13 BioVenture View 1 (1998); Biotech Hearing, supra note 30, at 56 (testimony of Mark
Skaletsky, CEO of GelTex Pharmaceuticals).
36. See Walton, supra note 35, at 1.
37. See Biotech Hearing, supra note 30, at 56 (testimony of Mark Skaletsky, CEO of GelTex
Pharmaceuticals).
38. See id,
39. See id.
40. See Shaoyi Alex Liao, Resolving the Dilemmas Between the Patent Law and Biotechnology:
An Analysis of Three Recent Biotechnology Patent Cases, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech.
LJ. 229, 231 (1995).
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents delineates the scope of patent protection
by determining whether an accused device is equivalent to the patented
invention.41 Although the doctrine originated over a century ago,42 courts
have failed to develop a clear test for determining how the doctrine
applies.43 Recently, recognizing the inadequacy of the most commonly
used function-way-result test," the Federal Circuit set forth the
"insubstantial difference" test as the ultimate test for the doctrine4 5 It
included "known interchangeability" as an additional factor for
determining insubstantial differences between accused and patented
devices.' Courts also have imposed limitations on the doctrine to prevent
the undue expansion of the scope of the patent protection and to provide
adequate public notice.47
A. Competing Policy Issues Underlying the Doctrine ofEquivalents
The doctrine of equivalents attempts to balance two competing policy
concerns: (1) protecting patentees' exclusive rights to inventions against
others that make insignificant changes to the patented inventions, and
(2) providing the public with notice about the limits of the patent
monopoly.48 On one hand, to limit the scope of the patent protection to
the literal wording of the claims "Would be to convert the protection of
the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing."4 9 Such a limitation
would encourage unscrupulous copyists to make insignificant changes to
41. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 25-28 (1997); Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
42. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 339 (1853) (holding that pyramidal-shaped
railroad car infringed patent relating to conical-shaped railroad car).
43. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40 (pointing out shortcomings of function-way-result
test and insubstantial difference test).
44. See id.
45. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (per curiam), rev'don other grounds, 520 U.S. 17.
46. See Warner-Jeninson, 520 U.S. at 36; Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519.
47. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30.
48. See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Ronald E.
Larson, Balancing the Competing Policies Underlying the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law, 21
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 28 (1993); Werner Sterner, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis and
Markman and a Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 Nova L. Rev. 783,794 (1998).
49. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
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the patented devices so they could enjoy the fruit of patentees' laborfs° It
would effectively deprive patentees of the benefit of their inventions and
would foster concealment rather than disclosure of inventions." On the
other hand, other inventors are entitled to notice of the boundaries of
patents so that they can either license inventions from patentees or
legally design around the inventions.5 2 Both policies promote innovation
in technology."
B. The Evolving Test for the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.
In a landmark decision, Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co.,' the U.S. Supreme Court held that a patentee may
invoke the doctrine of equivalents to prohibit the production of a device
if it performed substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result as the patented device. 5 The issue in that
case was whether a change in the chemical composition of an electric
welding flux was insubstantial enough to invoke the doctrine of
equivalents.56 The Court reasoned that "if two devices do the same work
in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same
result, they are the. same, even though they differ in name, form, or
shape."5" Based on the trial court's finding that the accused product was
substantially identical to the patented device in both operation and result,
the Graver Tank majority held that the defendant infringed the patent.5 8
50. See id.
51. Seeid.
52. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warer-Jenkinson Co. 62 F.3d 1512, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(Plager, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17; see also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at
29 (stating that broad application of doctrine of equivalents conflicts with definitional and public-
notice functions of statutory claiming requirement).
53. See Permwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Bennett, J.,
dissenting).
54. 339 U.S. 605.
55. See id. (citing Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
56. See id. at 606-07. The patent claims for the flux composition included essentially a
combination of alkaline earth metal silicates (silicates of calcium and magnesium) and calcium
fluoride. See id at 610. The accused flux substituted silicates of calcium and manganese-the latter
not an alkaline earth metal-for silicates of calcium and magnesium. See id. In all other respects, the
two compositions were alike. See id.
57. Id. at 608 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).
58. Seeid. at611-12.
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In addition to the fumction-way-result test, the Court also required that
equivalency be determined in consideration of the context of the patent,
the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case.59 It further
emphasized "known interchangeability"--whether persons reasonably
skilled in the relevant technical area would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one
that was-as an important factor to consider in applying the doctrine of
equivalents.' Finally, the Court regarded the evidence of independent
research or experiments by the accused infringer as relevant in
determining equivalency.61
2. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.
During the forty years following the Graver Tank decision, courts
exclusively applied the function-way-result test.62 However, in Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,' the Federal Circuit
rejected the Graver Tank Court's regard for the function-way-result test
as the only test for the doctrine of equivalents.' The Federal Circuit held
that the ultimate test for infringement analysis was the "insubstantial
difference" test, which asks whether the accused device was substantially
different from the patented device.6' The court stated that the function-
way-result test would often suffice to show the extent of the differences
between the accused and patented devices.' The court, however, noted
that other factors, such as evidence of the known interchangeability of
the accused and patented elements, evidence of copying, and evidence of
designing around a patented invention, might also be informative in
some cases.67 In addition, the court explained that evidence of
independent research by the accused infringer was relevant to
equivalency analysis because it was useful to refute a patent owner's
59. See id. at 609.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 611-12.
62. See Adelman et al., supra note 15, at 900.
63. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17
(1997).
64. See id. at 1518.
65. See id. at 1517.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1519-20.
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contention that the accused infringer copied the substance of the patented
invention.68
3. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hilton Davis, but did not
clarify which test-the function-way-result test or the "insubstantial
difference" test-was appropriate in applying the doctrine of equivalents.
The Court left that decision to the Federal Circuit's discretion.69 The
Supreme Court regarded the particular linguistic framework for applying
the doctrine as less important than whether courts directed their inquiries
at the essential issue: did the accused device contain elements equivalent
to the patented invention?" It held that different tests might be desirable
in different situations.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
explanation about why evidence of independent research by an accused
infringer was relevant to the equivalency determination.72 The Court held
that the evidence of independent research was relevant not because it
might disprove the contention that the accused infringer copied the
patented invention, but instead because tend to prove whether a person
skilled in the relevant technical area would have known of the
interchangeability between elements in the accused and patented
devices.7" The Supreme Court criticized the Federal Circuit's suggestion
that an alleged infringer's behavior, whether copying or designing
around a patent, indirectly reflects the substantiality of the differences
between the accused and patented devices.74 The Court pointed out that it
was nearly impossible to "distinguish between the intentional copyist
making minor changes to lower the risk of legal action and the
incremental innovator designing around the patented device, yet seeking
to retain as much as is permissible of the patented advance.""
68. See id. at 1520.
69. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
70. See id.
71. See id. ("Different linguistic frameworks may be more suitable to different cases, depending
on their particular facts.'.
72. See id. at 35-36.
73. See ic at36.
74. See id. at 35.
75. Id. at 36.
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In sum, because the U.S. Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson
indicated that the Federal Circuit was responsible for the development of
the test for applying the doctrine of equivalents, the current test seems to
be the "insubstantial difference" test. To determine whether there is
substantial differences between the accused and the patented devices,
courts ask whether the accused device performs a substantially similar
function in a substantially similar way to achieve a substantially similar
result as the patented device. In addition, courts may consider other
evidence such as the known interchangeability between the accused and
the patented devices and the evidence of independent research by the
accused infringer.
C. Limitations to the Doctrine ofEquivalents'Application
The application of the doctrine of equivalents is limited by three legal
tenets that play important roles in infringement cases.76 These limitations
are intended to prevent undue expansion of the scope of patent protection
and to provide adequate public notice.
1. The All Elements Rule
The all elements rule requires courts to apply the doctrine of
equivalents to individual elements of a claim, not to the invention as a
whole." Accordingly, infringement occurs only if each element of a
claim either literally or equivalently exists in the accused product.78
However, the courts' application of the all elements rule has become
less stringent over the years. Initially, courts required a one-to-one
correspondence of the individual elements between the accused and the
patented devices.79 Later, the Federal Circuit held that the all elements
requirement was met if an equivalent element exists for every element of
the claim somewhere in the accused device, but not necessarily in a
corresponding component." Even after the U.S. Supreme Court
76. See Adelman et al., supra note 15, at 934.
77. See Warner-Jenldnson., 520 U.S. at 29.
78. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing
Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
79. See id. at 939 (holding that accused fruit sorter did not infringe patented sorter because
memory components of accused sorter did not perform same or equivalent function of corresponding
components of patented sorter).
80. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc. 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (holding that accused optical fiber with negatively doped cladding and core was equivalent to
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emphasized the importance of the all elements rule,8' the Federal Circuit
further relaxed the rule's application and found infringement even when
the accused device did not have all the elements of the patented
product.82 The Federal Circuit stated that the lack of an element should
not change the analysis of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
if later-developed technology obfuscated the significance of the
limitation. 3
2. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel precludes patentees from asserting
equivalence to the subject matter they clearly gave up when the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected their patent applications.'
Prosecution history includes all of the documents that record the
communications between a patent applicant and the PTO during patent
prosecution.85 However, not every amendment or argument that a
patentee made during patent prosecution automatically surrenders the
subject matter that the amendment or argument concerns.8 6 Prosecution
history estoppel bars the doctrine of equivalents' application only to the
subject matter of arguments or amendments that relate to patentability or
that otherwise clearly indicate the abandonment of the subject matter.87
patented fiber with cladding and positively doped core because limitation of appropriate refraction
index differential between cladding and core was found in accused fiber).
81. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.
82. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that
although accused device did not have limitations relating to sending instantaneous spin angel
position data to ground crew, it nevertheless infringed patented device).
83. See id.
84. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 20, § 2F[2][c], at 2-270. This doctrine is also referred to as
"file-wrapper estoppel." Id.
85. See generally 4 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 18.05, at 18-151 (1992).
86. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33 (stating that where reason for amendment was not
related to avoiding prior art, introduction of new element by amendment does not necessarily
preclude application of doctrine of equivalents).
87. The standard for determining whether prosecution history estoppel should apply to a subject
matter is "whether one of ordinary skill in the art would objectively conclude from the prosecution
history that an applicant surrendered it." Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The court listed three situations where the prosecution history estoppel applies:
(1) the subject matter was deemed unpatentable in view of the prior art, (2) an applicant narrowed a
claim element in the face of an examiner's rejection based on the prior art, and (3) an applicant's
arguments clearly and unmistakably surrendered the subject matter. See id.
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3. The Prior Art
The prior art itself imposes the third limitation on the application of
the doctrine of equivalents."8 The rationale underlying this limitation is
that patentees should not be able to expand patent protection to cover
subject matter on which they could not have obtained patents from the
PTO in the first place. 9 Because the prior art limits what inventors could
have claimed, it also limits the applicability of the doctrine of
equivalents. 90
In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates,9 the
Federal Circuit established a method of determining whether the prior art
prevented a patentee from invoking the doctrine of equivalents.92 The
issue in that case was whether Dunlop's golf balls infringed Wilson's
golf ball patents.93 The court suggested that it might be helpful to first
draft a hypothetical patent claim sufficient in scope to cover both the
patented and the accused devices.' The inquiry then became whether the
PTO would have allowed the hypothetical claim in light of the prior art.95
If the PTO allowed the hypothetical claim, then prior art would not bar a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.96 Finding that
the hypothetical claim covering both Dunlop's and Wilson's golf balls
would be obvious in light of the prior art, the Federal Circuit held that
Dunlop did not infringe Wilson Sporting Goods' patent.97
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TEST FOR THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The current test for the application of the doctrine of equivalents
creates problems in resolving infringement cases. The function-way-
88. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir.
1990). For the definition of the term "prior art," see supra note 23.
89. See Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
90. See id.
91. 904 F.2d 677.
92. See id. at 684.
93. See id. at 678-81. David Geoffrey & Associates owns Dunlop.
94. See id. at 684.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 685. A person cannot get a patent for an obvious invention. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103
(West Supp. 1998).
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result test only describes the essential equivalence inquiry in a slightly
different way and thus fails to provide any practical guidance. In
addition, the test is not applicable to certain infringement disputes in
biotechnology. Although the known interchangeability factor is helpful
for courts to determine equivalency, it is only a factor rather than an
independent test and it is not a mandatory consideration in all cases.
Furthermore, the all elements rule adds another level of confusion to the
current test because courts must first define what constitutes an element
and then examine the equivalency for each element of a patent claim.
A. The Function- Way-Result Test Is Inappropriately Vague
The function-way-result test provides little guidance to the courts
because it is essentially a different expression of the equivalency inquiry.
Although the test directs the inquiry to three aspects of an invention,9" it
nevertheless fails to define what constitutes to a significant difference in
the function, way, and result of an accused device when the accused
device is compared to the patented device." The lack of clearly
delineated underlying principles in determining the substantial differ-
ences between the accused and the patented devices renders courts'
application of the test unhelpful in terms of precedential value.'
Prevalent litigation practices also undermine the utility of the
function-way-result test."0 ' Litigants generally characterize the
inventions' function, way, and result differently. Patentees describe these
terms broadly while the accused infringers define the terms narrowly." 2
98. See Warner-Jenkinson Co.v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
99. See Michael T. Siekman, The Expanded Hypothetical Claim Test: A Better Test for
Infringement of Biotechnology Patents Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 2 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L.
6 at 5, Mar. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, Mass. Library, BUJSTL file. (criticizing question-
begging nature of fimction-way-result test).
100. See Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Marchlett's Sons, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 1929). Judge
Learned Hand commented on the test's deficiency: "Each case is inevitably a matter of degree, as so
often happens, and other decisions have little or no value. The usual ritual [of invoking function,
way, and result], which is so often repeated and which has so little meaning,... does not help much
in application; it is no more than a way of stating the problem." Id; see also Chisum, supra note 85,
§ 18.04[5], at 18-405 (stating that function-way-result test is too general to be of much assistance in
resolution of particular problems).
I01. See Adelman et al., supra note 15, at 900; Chisum, supra note 85, §18.04[5J, at 18-407.
102. See Chisum, supra note 85, §18.03[2], at 18-111; Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 20,
§ 2F[2][bJ, at 2-255.
Vol. 74:885, 1999
Nonobviousness Test in Biotechnology
Often a court's determination of infringement simply depends upon
whose characterization it accepts. 3
B. The Function-Way-Result Test Is Not Applicable in Certain
Biotechnology Patent Infringement Disputes
In Warner-Jenkinson, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that although the
function-way-result test might be suitable for analyzing mechanical
devices, it provides a poor framework for analyzing other products or
processes." The Court's observation proves especially true as applied to
biotechnological inventions.
The function, way, and result components are often indistinguishable
from one another in the biotechnology context, as illustrated in
Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd. 5 This Federal Circuit case
concerned a patented recombinant protein, tissue plasminogen activator
(t-PA), which activates plasminogen and converts it to plasmin.' ° The
accused product, FEiX, was a modified protein with the same activating
function and was also produced by using recombinant technology. 7 The
Federal Circuit defined the function of human t-PA for the purposes of
equivalency analysis as being a catalyst for converting plasminogen to
plasmin and binding plasim to fibrin.' ° It noted that the affinity to fibrin,
the mode of binding to fibrin, and the half-life of FEIX were different
from the patented t-PA.' ° Thus, the court held that FEIX was not an
equivalent of the patented t-PA."°
In his concurring opinion, Judge Lourie emphasized the limitation of
the function-way-result test."' He criticized the test because it did not
103. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 20, § 2F[2][b], at 2-255.
104. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,39-40 (1997).
105. 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
106. See id. at 1557. Plasmin is an enzyme that binds to fibrin and severs the bonds between the
fibrin molecules, resulting in the dissolution of fibrin clots in the human body. See i The t-PA
consists of five separate domains: the Finger (F) region, the Epidermal Growth (E) region, the
Kringle 1 (K1) region, the Kringle 2 (K2) region, and the Serine Protease (P) region. See id. at 1559
n.4.
107. See id. at 1557, 1559 n.4. FEIX lacked the F region and most of the E region of natural t-PA
and had an amino acid substitution at position 117 of KI region, which eliminated one of the
carbohydrate chains. See id. at 1559 n.4.
108. See id. at 1567.
109. See id. at 1568-69.
110. See id. at 1569.
111. See id. at 1570.
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fully elucidate the equivalency inquiry in infringement cases that
involved chemical or biotechnological products."2 He found it difficult
to decide whether the half-life should be part of the "way" analysis or a
different "result," and whether the binding to fibrin constituted
"function" or part of the "way" t-PA dissolves clots.l13
Another reason for the difficulty in applying the function-way-result
test to biotechnological inventions is that scientists often know little
about how these inventions actually work and therefore can never fulfill
the "way" requirement."' In such situations, a judge or a jury may reduce
the function-way-result test to a mere comparison of observable end
results between the accused and the patented products." 5 This is exactly
what happened in Genentech. Supposing that the majority was correct in
concluding that the binding of t-PA to fibrin was the "function" of t-PA,
then the manner in which the t-PA binds to fibrin and the affinity of t-
PA to fibrin became the "way" and the "result," respectively. Because
Genentech did not know the mechanism for the binding, the court relied
heavily on the FE1X's relatively low affinity to fibrin to reach its
conclusion that FE1X was not equivalent to t-PA."6
C. The Usefulness of the Known Interchangeability Factor Is Limited
Unlike the inherently vague function-way-result test, the known
interchangeability factor can be somewhat useful in resolving patent
infringement disputes. However, its usefulness is limited. The known
interchangeability is but one factor to be considered and does not by
itself establish equivalence."' In addition, courts do not have to consider
this factor in every case. The Federal Circuit stated that the function-
way-result test alone often suffices to determine equivalency if similarity
of function, way, and result left little doubt that there were only
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent Protection, 102 Yale L.J.
777, 791 (1992).
115. See id.
116. See Genentech, 29 F.3d at 1568-69.
117. See Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
that "an interchangeable device is not necessarily an equivalent device," and holding that trial judge
erroneously relied on interchangeability of patented and accused capped wheel nuts to support
finding of infringement under doctrine of equivalents).
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insubstantial differences between the accused and the patented devices.'
The court further indicated that whether trial courts should consider other
factors would depend on the way the parties framed their arguments." 9
D. The All Elements Rule Increases Current Confusion
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the all elements rule
further complicates equivalency analysis. Unlike the other two
limitations to the application of the doctrine of equivalents, the all
elements rule is unsound in principle. Expanding one element into two or
combining two elements into one should not change the application of
the doctrine of equivalents. 2 Although the Federal Circuit recognized
that a strict application of an all elements approach was little more than a
literal infringement inquiry,' the Federal Circuit failed to define how far
beyond the literal scope of a claim the all elements rule should limit the
application of the doctrine of equivalents.'2 Even though the Federal
Circuit recently relaxed the application of the rule,"m different courts or
panels may draw inconsistent conclusions in resolving infringement
disputes due to their differing interpretations of the rule.
In addition, the all elements rule greatly frustrates patent law's public
notice purpose. Given the countless variety of inventions, it is difficult to
define the term "element." Courts must determine on a case-by-case
basis what constitutes an element for the equivalency analysis. For
instance, it is uncertain whether a claim directed to a DNA or protein
sequence consists of only one element or whether each nucleotide, codon
(three consecutive nucleotides encoding an amino acid), amino acid, or
118. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
119. See id. at 1522.
120. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman,
J., commenting).
121. See id. at 939-40 (Bennett, J., dissenting); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[A]ny analysis of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents necessarily deals with subject matter that is 'beyond,' 'ignored' by, and not
included in the literal scope of a claim.").
122. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1317 The court stated that "subject matter [that
is beyond, ignored by, and not included in the literal scope of a claim] is not necessarily 'specifically
excluded' from coverage under the doctrine [of equivalents] unless its inclusion is somehow
inconsistent with the language of the claim." The court's statement is ambiguous because subject
matter outside the literal scope of a claim, strictly speaking, is inconsistent with the language of the
claim.
123. See supra Part ll.C.1.
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protein domain (such as the F region and the E region of t-PA) is a
distinct element.'24 This uncertainty is likely to stunt the growth of the
biotechnology industry because investors will be reluctant to sponsor a
project without a reliable prediction about whether that project will
infringe others' patents.
Furthermore, due to the vague definition of "element,"'25 the case law
will have to evolve significantly before the application of the all
elements rule is refined, if it can be refined at all.'26 So far, the Federal
Circuit has declined to adopt any definitive formula to determine how
equivalency to a required element in a patent claim is met. 27 The Federal
Circuit, however, agreed with the use of the function-way-result test by a
district court in determining whether elements of an accused device were
equivalents to those of a patented device. 28 Given its inherent vagueness
and limited applicability when used to examine an invention as a whole,
it is doubtful that the test would be much help in the equivalency inquiry
at the element level.
IV. THE NONOBVIOUSNESS TEST IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Courts should adopt a nonobviousness test for equivalency analysis in
patent infringement disputes similar to the nonobviousness requirement
for patentability. This proposed nonobviousness test would consist of a
two-pronged analysis. The first prong would impose the prior art and the
prosecution history estoppel limitations on the application of the doctrine
of equivalents. The second prong would ask whether a person skilled in
the relevant technical area would find an accused device obvious in light
of a patented invention. The proposed test would eliminate the inherent
vagueness of the function-way-result test. In addition, it would evaluate
inventions as a whole and thus avoid the confusion associated with the
124. See Robert D. Bajefsky & Howard W. Levine, Impact of 'Hilton Davis' on Biotech is
Unclear: 'All-Elements Rule' Upheld by the High Court May Not Be Easy to Apply to a DNA
Sequence, Nat'l L.J., Jun. 16, 1997, at C9-C1O.
125. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Patent Law and Policy 867-68 (2d ed. 1997).
126. See Jing James Li, Doctrine of Equivalents Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 199, 212 (1998).
127. See Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that
court has not set forth test as to how one proves that element in accused device is substantial
equivalent of element in claims).
128. See id. at 1326.
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all elements rule. To understand the proposed test, it is necessary to
introduce the nonobviousness requirement for patentability.
A. The Nonobviousness Requirement for Patentability
While the doctrine of equivalents asks how different an accused
device must be to avoid infringing a patented device, the nonobviousness
requirement for patentability asks how different from the prior art
inventions must be to be eligible to obtain patents.12 9 The current test for
the nonobviousness requirement is based on the Patent Act of 1952,
which attempted to establish invention standards and clarify the
confusion caused by earlier judicially created standards. 3 ' Because it
uses the knowledge possessed by a typical skilled person in the pertinent
technical area as the yardstick,"' the current nonobviousness test is
applicable to inventions in all areas, including biotechnology.
1. Early Development of the Nonobviousness Requirement
Although early patent statutes required only that an invention be novel
and useful to be patented,"' the U.S. Supreme Court, as early as the mid-
nineteenth century, imposed a requirement similar to the current
nonobviousness requirement.3 The Court held that to be patentable, an
invention must make an improvement that surpasses the knowledge and
skills possessed by an ordinary person in the pertinent technical area."M
However, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions did not use an
objective standard to determine patentability. Instead, the Court framed
the invention standard in terms of various vague expressions and raised it
far above the mere knowledge and skills that a typical person in the
pertinent technical area would have. 35 The inventiveness requirement
129. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1998).
130. See PJ. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 Am. Pat. L. Ass'n QJ. 87 (1977); L. James
Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 658, 674 n.62 (1955).
131. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
132. See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 293,303.
133. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248,267 (1851).
134. See id.
135. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891) (describing invention as "that
impalpable something"); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885)
(descnbing invention standard as "the creative work of that inventive faculty"); Altantic Works v.
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reached its height in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp.,'36 in which the Court announced that a patentable device must
reveal a "flash of creative genius."'37
2. The Patent Act of 1952
To clarify the standard of patentability and counteract the effects of
earlier court decisions, Congress enacted section 103(a) of the Patent Act
of 1952.138 The statute provides that an invention is not patentable when
"the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which it pertains."'39 Thus, section 103(a) clarified for
the first time in patent law history that to be patentable, an invention
must be nonobvious in addition to useful and novel. 4 ' This section also
rejected the "flash of genius" requirement as reaching too far. 4 '
3. The Current Nonobviousness Test
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the meaning of section 103
in the landmark case Graham v. John Deere Co. '42 To determine whether
an invention is obvious, courts should consider the scope and content of
the prior art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and
Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) (describing invention standard as "some substantial discovery or
invention"); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 497 (1876) (describing invention
standard as "inventive effort").
136. 314 U.S. 84(1941).
137. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court elaborated on the invention standard as follows:
We may concede that the functions performed by Mead's combination were new and useful. But
that does not necessarily make the device patentable. Under the statute.., the device must not
only be "new and useful," it must also be an "invention" or "discovery." ... [I]t has been
recognized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a patent more ingenuity
must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art.... That is to say the new
device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill
of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the public domain.
Id. at 90-91.
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 1998).
140. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
141. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
142. 383 U.S. 1.
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the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent area.143 The ultimate question is
whether the prior art would suggest to those with ordinary skills in the art
how to make the claimed invention.1" In addition, courts may use
secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-felt but
unsolved needs, or the failure of others to shed light on the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the invented subject matter.145
The Federal Circuit further emphasized secondary considerations in
determining the nonobviousness of an invention. It extended the list of
secondary considerations to include unexpected results, evidence of
copying, licensing, and laudatory statements by an infringer. 46 The
Federal Circuit also held that courts should always consider such
objective considerations. 47
In determining the nonobviousness of an invention, the Federal Circuit
developed the procedural rule of "primafacie obviousness" as a burden-
shifting tool.'48 According to this rule, either the PTO or a party
challenging the validity of a patent during infringement litigation bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that the claimed subject matter would
be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.'49 After the prima facie
establishment of obviousness, the burden then shifts to the patentee or
prospective patentee to rebut the obviousness of the invention. 5 After
the rebuttal, the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts back to the PTO or
the party challenging the validity.'
143. See id. at 17.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 17-18.
146. See Halliburton Co. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1973, 1979 (W.D. Okla. 1988)
(including copying, unexpected results, and licensing as secondary considerations in determining
nonobviousness), affid, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. BOC
Group, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 897, 914 (D.NJ. 1987) (including laudatory statement by alleged infringer
as secondary consideration in determining nonobviousness).
147. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1986) ("Objective evidence... is not merely icing on the cake."); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that courts must consider evidence of secondary
considerations in determining obviousness).
148. In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
149. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
150. See id.
151. See Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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4. A Biotechnology Example
In determining whether a biotechnological invention meets the
nonobviousness requirement for patentability, courts consider the
Graham factors as well as other factors. For instance, courts also inquire
whether, using the techniques revealed in the prior art, those of ordinary
skill would have a reasonable expectation of success. 2 A prior art
reference that makes it "obvious to try" an invention is not sufficient to
show that the invention is obvious.'53 In addition, hindsight cannot be
used in the determination of obviousness." 4
Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,55 was the first
nonobviousness case involving a biotechnological invention. The
invention in dispute was a "sandwich" immunoassay using monoclonal
antibodies."5 6 The Federal Circuit found that all the references, including
the method of producing monoclonal antibodies, the usefulness of
monoclonal antibodies in the characterization, and localization of a
peptide and sandwich immunoassays with polyclonal antibodies, did not
suggest the claimed invention. 57 The court noted that these references at
most were invitations to try monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays.
58
In reaching its conclusion that the immunoassay was nonobvious from
the prior art, the court also took account of objective secondary
considerations such as increase of market share, unexpected results,
greater sensitivity, and greater reliability of the immunoassay than those
of other assays.
5 9
B. The Proposed Nonobviousness Test for the Doctrine of Equivalents
The proposed nonobviousness test, as applied to the doctrine of
equivalents, would consist of a two-pronged analysis.'6° The first prong
152. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
153. See Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
154. See In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is impermissible ... simply to
engage in a hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention, using the applicant's structure as a
template and selecting elements from references to fill the gaps.").
155. 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
156. See id. at 1368-69.
157. See id. at 1383.
158. See id. at 1380.
159. See id. at 1382-83.
160. Several commentators have proposed using nonobviousness tests for the application of the
doctrine of equivalents. See Toshiko Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis: A
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would focus on whether, in light of the prior art and subject matters that
the patentee clearly gave up during patent prosecution, the accused
product is obvious to a person of ordinary skills in the pertinent technical
area. Both the prior art and the ordinary skills in the pertinent technical
area would be defined as of the time of the patented device's invention.
If the accused product is obvious in light of the prior art or subject
matters that the patentee had clearly surrendered, the accused device
does not infringe the patented invention. This conclusion is based on the
reasoning that if the accused device can be derived exclusively from the
prior art or subject matters that the patentee clearly gave up, the alleged
infringer does not need to use the patented invention. In other words, the
first prong of the analysis would reflect the prior art and prosecution
history estoppel limitations to the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.
If the accused product is not obvious from the prior art, then the trier
of fact would have to conduct the second prong of the analysis to
determine whether the accused product is modification of the patented
technology obvious to a person of ordinary skills in the pertinent
technical area at the time of the alleged infringement. If the accused
product or process is obvious in light of the patent claims, it infringes the
patented invention.
C. Application of the Nonobviousness Test to Genentech, Inc. v.
Wellome Foundation Ltd.
The facts underlying Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd.61
exemplify how the application of the nonobviousness test would resolve
an infringement dispute. Applying the proposed test, a court would first
determine whether FE1X was obvious from the prior art to a person
skilled in recombinant protein technique at the time of the recombinant
t-PA invention. The answer would be "no" because the prior art did not
Comparative Law Analysis, 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech. LJ. 479, 516-19 (1996) (proposing that
requirement for patent infringement should be same as that for patentability); Siekman, supra note
99, at 17-32 (proposing to use obviousness test not only for prior art limitation to application of
doctrine of equivalents, but also for application of doctrine itself). Siekma's proposed test also
includes the enablement requirement, which requires the specification in the allegedly infringed
patent enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technical area to make and to use the accused
device. See id. However, because the nonobviousness test contains the enablement requirement, see
Part IV.A.4, the enablement requirement of Siekman's tests is redundant. This Comment instead
proposes exclusively using the nonobviousness test.
161. 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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contain the t-PA DNA sequence essential for making further
modifications of the t-PA protein.'62 The court would then proceed to the
second prong of the nonobviousness test to determine whether the
modification of t-PA to produce FE1X was obvious to an ordinary
skilled recombinant protein researcher at the time of alleged
infringement. The answer to the second inquiry would also likely be "no"
because even the patentee characterized the effects of both amino acid
substitution at position 117 of the K1 region and the deletion of the F and
E regions in the FEIX protein as unexpected.'63 Thus, FE1X is not an
equivalent of the t-PA protein.
D. The Advantages of the Proposed Nonobviousness Test
1. The Nonobviousness Test Provides Appropriate Patent Protection
Appropriately defining patent protection boundaries is crucial to
promoting technological innovation. For example, granting an extremely
large range of equivalents to patents discourages competitors from
improving the technology because the patentee retains the exclusive right
to capitalize on that field of technology."6 On the other hand, granting an
inappropriately narrow range of equivalents to patents discourages
prospective inventors from disclosing their inventions for fear that
competitors will benefit from the inventors' efforts.' 65
The nonobviousness test would provide adequate protection to
patentees. By determining the equivalents at the time of infringement, the
test protects patentees not only for the claimed invention but also for its
equivalents obvious to one skilled in the pertinent technical area on the
infringement date.'66 Inventors, therefore, would not have to face the
somewhat impossible task of predicting technology's future development
162. Genentech's patent claims the t-PA sequence and is valid, so the prior art does not contain
the t-PA sequence. See id. at 1558.
163. See id. at 1564 n.23.
164. See Lewis, supra note 23, at 1423.
165. See id.
166. See Takenaka, supra note 160, at 518 (proposing dynamic invention scope theory that views
invention scope as consisting of claimed invention and its equivalents that are obvious to one skilled
in art on invention date).
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and drafting claims that cover hypothetical future competitors'
variations.' 67
The difficulty in drafting broad claims is especially pronounced for
pioneering biotechnological inventions. Although pioneer inventors
contribute more significantly to technological innovations than others,
they often may not be able to obtain broad claims because they likely fail
to disclose sufficiently all possible embodiments covered in the claims.
68
The stricter enablement requirement in biotechnology, due to its
unpredictability, may further limit the scope of patent claims for pioneer
biotechnology inventions. 69 Failure to provide protection covering the
obvious deviations of claimed inventions under the doctrine of
equivalents would allow competitors to take advantage of the literalism
of claim drafting and consequently discourage prospective inventors,
especially pioneer inventors, from disclosing their inventions for fear that
competitors will benefit from the inventors' efforts.170
In addition, the nonobviousness test would be especially advantageous
in providing adequate protection to biotechnological inventions in light
of the recently heightened written description requirement targeting
biotechnological inventions. To fulfill the written description
requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention in
sufficient detail so that one of ordinary skill in the relevant technical area
can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention.'
This requirement is intended to prevent an inventor from later claiming
something more than the inventor has actually invented as of the
application filing date. 72 Contrary to its precedent that adequate written
167. See generally Robert D. Katz & Steven E. Lee, Advanced Claim Drafing and Amendment
Writing for Chemical Inventions, 426 PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series 121, 125 (1995) (discussing difficulty of claim drafting).
168. See Takenaka, supra note 160, at 506; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 839, 854 (1990) (discussing pioneer
inventions and doctrine of equivalents).
169. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that in unpredictable technical
areas, required level of disclosure would be greater than disclosure of an invention involving
'predictable' factor such as mechanical or electrical element); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(C.C.P.A. 1970) ("the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of
unpredictability of the factors involved"); see also Adelman et al., supra note 15, at 580 (regarding
biotechnology and chemistry as unpredictable arts).
170. See Lewis, supra note 23, at 1421.
171. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he description must clearly
allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.").
172. See In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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descriptions of chemical and biotechnological compounds were not
restricted to disclosures of physical structure, 73 the Federal Circuit in
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. 74 invalidated
claims directed to vertebrate and mammalian insulin eDNA because the
patentee failed to disclose vertebrate or mammalian insulin cDNA
sequences other than rat insulin cDNA 7  The court emphasized that a
functional definition of cDNA was insufficient because it indicated only
"what the gene does, rather than what it is.'176 However, if it is obvious
to one of ordinary biotechnological skill to make or use vertebrate or
mammalian insulin cDNA in light of the patented rat insulin cDNA at the
time of alleged infringement, a court applying the proposed
nonobviousness test would find that the making or using of vertebrate or
mammalian cDNA infringed the rat insulin cDNA claim under the
doctrine of equivalents.
The nonobviousness test would not grant patentees overly broad
patent protection. 177 When a competitor makes changes that are obvious
to one skilled in the art at the time of the replacement, the resulting
product really represents imitation rather than substantial innovation. 178
To prevent such imitation, a court should interpret a patent to cover
obvious substitutions, whether or not the inventor anticipated these
variations and drafted claims to cover the substitutions. 179 However, if a
competitor's product is not obvious as compared to the patented
invention, the inventive effort should be exempted from infringement
173. See In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding that written description of patent
application adequately supported applicant's later presented claim to water-insoluble polyol even
though appellant described claimed compound by process of making it, not its physical structure); In
re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 836 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that structural description of claimed
adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) extracts was not required to satisfy written description
requirement of later submitted patent application claiming ACTH extract in terms of its amino acid
structure).
174. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
175. See id. at 1568-69.
176. See id. at 1568 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
177. The standard for patent infringement implemented by the current test for equivalency
analysis on an element-by-element basis is unreasonably high and uncertain, similar to the invention
standard prior to the Patent Act of 1952. For comparison between obviousness and the doctrine of
equivalents, see generally Stephen G. Kalinchak, Comment, Obviousness and the Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Law: Striving for Objective Criteria, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 577, 599-606
(1994).
178. See Takenaka, supra note 160, at 517.
179. See id.
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liability.18 A competitor does not infringe a patent if the competitor's
product is obvious from the prior art as of the invention date of the
patented device."'
2. The Nonobviousness Test Simplifies the Patent System
The application of the nonobviousness test to the doctrine of
equivalents would benefit the development of patent laws by simplifying
the patent system. Because the test for novelty in patent prosecution is
the same as that for literal infringement in patent infringement, 182 the use
of the nonobviousness test for determining infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents would unify standards for patent prosecution and
for patent infringement."3 Rather than searching for and developing a
new test for the equivalency analysis, courts could enjoy the benefit of a
rich body of case law on nonobviousness.1"
3. The Nonobviousness Test Provides Better Public Notice
Another major advantage of the proposed nonobviousness test over
the current test would be its lack of inherent vagueness. Using the well-
established nonobviousness framework, the proposed test would increase
the consistency and predictability of outcomes in infringement disputes,'
thus providing better public notice. It would help attract investment in
the biotechnology industry as well. Inventors could decide to seek patent
protection, to seek trade secret protection, to invent around the prior art,
or to donate to the public domain.'
V. CONCLUSION
The current test for determining whether a device is an equivalent of
and thus infringes a patented invention suffers from inherent vagueness
180. See id. at 496 (suggesting that courts should use same threshold for granting patent and for
escaping infringement charge).
181. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
182. See Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 20, § 2c[3][a], at 2-54 (citing Lewmar Marine v. Barient,
Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
183. See Takenaka, supra note 160, at 496-97.
184. See id. at497.
185. See Jeremy Cubert, U.S. Patent Policy and Biotechnology: Growing Pains on the Cutting
Edge, 77 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 151, 152 (1995).
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and provides little guidance in resolving infringement disputes. In
addition, the all elements rule, a limitation to the test, causes further
confusion. In contrast, the proposed nonobviousness test would clarify
the equivalency analysis by evaluating inventions as a whole. The test
would provide not only appropriate protection to patentees, but also
better public notice. Founded on over forty years of case law
development, the test would serve as a solid analytical framework for
infringement, which is critical to the rapid growth of the biotechnology
industry.
